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Global Development Bonds (GDBs) would
increase and improve finance for sustainable development by mobilizing larger
flows of private capital from institutional investors, who are currently unable
to invest in such activity because rated securities for such projects do not
exist.
Traditional public foreign aid is too scarce to meet the
developing world's urgent need for investment in sustainable development.
Meeting the United Nations Millennium
Development Goals with public foreign aid alone would require an
additional $50 billion a year, roughly double the current amount. GDBs would
enlist instead the vast resources and the efficiency, judgment, skills, and creativity
of private capital-market money managers in the effort to meet the world's
development goals. Economic development abroad will also open up new export
opportunities for U.S.
businesses, create U.S.
jobs, and generate tax revenue.
To date, the worldwide financing of sustainable development
has been largely the domain of public-sector agencies. While private-sector
investment in the developing world has surpassed official development
assistance since the end of the 1980s, debt and equity flows have been
volatile, trending downward since the late 1990s, and focused on selected
regions. Engaging capital markets more broadly is a major challenge, especially
tapping the large pools of capital managed by institutional investors that, by
fiduciary duty, invest conservatively. Public-sector risk mitigation programs
often are cumbersome and expensive because they are applied case-by-case and
lack a systematized approach.
GDBs would be a new form of collateralized debt obligation
(CDO), comparable to municipal bonds. Like all bonds, GDBs would be long-term,
interest-bearing debt instruments providing a fixed return to the investor.
GDBs would be issued by private entities, and the money raised from GDB sales
would go through commercial banks to qualifying uses in qualifying countries.
Qualifying uses would include projects associated with sustainability, such as
water and clean energy development. Country qualifications would pertain to, at
a minimum, free markets and the rule of law. Additional country eligibility
criteria, for example, those associated with the Millennium Challenge Account,
could also be adopted.
As a private financial product, GDBs must offer buyers an
attractive risk-adjusted rate of return in order to compete with other
investment products in the market. The rate of return is basically a function
of the soundness of the underlying project investments. The private sector is
well-equipped to make evaluations of soundness. The private financial sector is
also adept at managing many types of risks. Like other bonds, GDBs would reduce
their risk through diversification and other sophisticated financial
arrangements.
Private investment in the developing world poses unique types
of risk. Insuring against political and foreign exchange risks has historically
been expensive enough to discourage private investment. The U.S. government
would play a limited but critical role in GDBs by mitigating these types of
risk, e.g., by providing political risk insurance and foreign exchange
coverage. With the proper private-sector arrangements and public-sector
enhancements, GDBs could receive the investment-grade bond ratings needed to
qualify for purchase by institutional investors, providing a pathway to engage
their assets in sustainable development. U.S. pension funds alone totaled
$6.4 trillion in 2001.